= 100 – 2Y, and the The inverse market demand curve for salmon is given by P(Y) total cost function for any firm in the industry is given by TC(y) = 4y. %3D a. Suppose that two Cournot firms operated in the market. What would be the reaction function for Firm 1 and the reaction function of Firm 2? (Notes: The marginal cost is not zero). If the firms were operating at the Cournot equilibrium point, what would the industry output and price be? b. For the Cournot case, draw the two reaction curves and indicate the equilibrium point on the graph

= 100 – 2Y, and the The inverse market demand curve for salmon is given by P(Y) total cost function for any firm in the industry is given by TC(y) = 4y. %3D a. Suppose that two Cournot firms operated in the market. What would be the reaction function for Firm 1 and the reaction function of Firm 2? (Notes: The marginal cost is not zero). If the firms were operating at the Cournot equilibrium point, what would the industry output and price be? b. For the Cournot case, draw the two reaction curves and indicate the equilibrium point on the graph

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

ChapterB: Differential Calculus Techniques In Management

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1E

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