China's Economy And Its Worst Economic Slow Down

China has become a perceived threat to the U.S. economy because of the increasing trade deficit between the two countries, their ability to undercut production costs of similar products produced in the United States, and the amount of leverage that China has over the United States due to amount of money that has been lent by China. Although the United States has taken steps to close the trade deficit, such as convincing China to raise prices on their exports, there is still a considerable gap (Prasad). The United States government continues to print money that they simply can’t afford, therefore, relying even more heavily on China sustaining the value of their currency. Unless the United States is able to close the trade deficit and regain control of our economic flexibility, the problems caused by foreign countries owning our debt will remain eminent.

Since the reform and opening up, the economy of China grows significantly, as an emerging economy, China's economy has made tremendous contributions to the global economy, and Renminbi has become one of the most important currency in the world. According to the survey conducted by China National Bureau of Statistics found that from 1979 to 2012, China has attained an annual average growth rate of 9.8% for its national economy, while the annual average growth of the world economy is only 2.8 % during the same period. In past 30 years, China's GDP surpassed Japan’s, China became the world 's second largest economy, in addition, the huge total volume of trade makes China become the world 's largest trading nation. The contribution of China’s

The economic growth rate of China rate grew by 1.8 percent following the measure of economic growth which is the GDP growth rate. The GDP growth rate is one of the adequate economic growth measures. It indicates that the rate expanded 1.8 percent in the second quarter of 2016 increasing from the previous quarter of 1.2 percent growth. It also surpassed the market projections of 1.6 percent expansion (Levchenko & Zhang, 2016). It was the strongest economic growth

Hung’s stated goals are as follows. First, he aims to outline the historical origins of the capitalist boom in China as well as the conditions which predicated said boom. He also names four conceptions against history to explore the global effects of China’s capitalist boom and the limit of that boom. Firstly, he seeks to challenge the notion that China is challenging the United States neoliberal order. Secondly, he examines the belief that the increasing incomes of poor Chinese citizens helps to reverse worldwide income polarization. Thirdly, he analyzes the claim that China’s rise is challenging Western dominion over the world, and is radically altering the world order. Lastly, he plans to evaluate the assertion that China has been emerging as the most powerful driver of growth since the global financial crisis. He plans to devote a single chapter to the refutation of each of these views and explanations of why they overstate the importance of China, in addition to several introductory chapters describing China’s rise. He aims to prove with this work that China is no different than the other major capitalist powers, that its boom is dependent on the global neoliberal order, that its boom contributes to rampant inequality, and, in sum, that China is just a foundation of the capitalist status quo.

its history of booms and busts [4], is currently in its worst economic standing since 1990s. The recent

Concerned investors overreacted to the news of a slower Chinese economy, which partly explains the stock market turmoil in the U.S. and around the world. China’s economy is not immune from the business cycle. Its economy’s growth rate eventually came down from the double digits to the single digits as it undergoes structural changes. China is shifting from an export-led to a domestic consumption driven economy. Since 1976, the beginning of China’s journey towards integration into the global economy, annual GDP growth averaged 9.5%. Since 2012, growth has been below average falling to 6.8% in the fourth quarter of 2015. While it can be argued that China’s economic slowdown has both direct and indirect effects on the U.S. economy through trade and financial flows, a slowing Chinese economy has marginal effects on credit unions. Moreover, it is difficult to aggregate the effects of China’s economic slowdown in future U.S. economic growth.

The Chinese economy can be viewed as the cornerstone of the global economy. The current global GDP, measured in purchasing power parity of nearly 60%, as well as current international rate of growth at more than 80%, is primarily accounted for by China and other neighbouring middle-income countries, such as India or Vietnam.[1] These numbers are significant in understanding our global economy, which is widely interconnected through alliances of trade, laws and finance, thereby affecting our daily lives politically, economically, socially and technologically.[2] With recent analysis indicating that China’s growth has declined to about 6.8% by the end of 2015[3], how would a crash in China’s economy affect the global market?

The world economic crisis of 2008 was the worst global crisis after the great recession of 1929-30. The most affected economies from the crisis are western European countries. The economic crisis sub sequentially lowers the growth rate of the economies. A large number of American companies incurred heavy losses and it declines in the gross domestic product widely known as GDP of the country. China plays a significant role during the economic crises (Lardy & Subramanian, 2012). China was full of financial funds and reserves when the other economies were down falling due to the economic crisis. The world economic downturn of 2008-09 emerged as an opportunity for china to gain sustainable growth and

In the recent past, China’s economy has grown at a high rate attracting the attention of the foreign investors. Its gross domestic product has also been high, with the year 2014 recording the highest figure of over ten percent of the world’s economy. The overall structure of its economy has also improved; the unemployment rates have gone down with prices rising at a moderate rate. It is always clear that with a high rate of unemployment within a country, the income levels also tend to be low affecting the living standards of the people, which in turn results to lower productivity levels in the country. Regardless of maintaining a positive balance of payments, the country’s economy also faces some challenges. “China’s economy is facing economic challenge regarding possibilities of deflationary risks” (Mulroney 15). Its economy is also experiencing relatively high costs incurred during the financing of the enterprises. The local governments are overburdened with massive amounts of debts that need to be clear. All these challenges are slowing down the rate of its economic growth.

Global economic uncertainty has increased and major economies have slowed down. At present, the world economy continues to undergo great changes, from the remarkable British "off the European" referendum to the volatile exchange rate, and the global economy uncertainty continues to increase. China economy has entered “new normal”, with GDP growth rate slowing down.

The economy of China has been on the rise at a rapid rate for more than three decades. Most of this growth higher productivity of labor highly contributed to this economic growth. On the contrary, as the economy widens, rate of employment diminishes along with a steady increase of the youth population. This paper focuses on understanding the efforts that led to the growth as well as the setbacks that China might encounter over the coming years. The challenge would be to maintain its rapid leap of economic growth. Key questions consist ofhow China will sustain its investments; whether these investments will lose productivity as the labor - capital ratio keeps on rising, whether employment rates will sustain urban migration.In the bottom line scenario, growth of the economy falls steadilyat a rate of six and a half percent by the year 2030 from the current ten percent (Chowand Kui-Wai 146).

The fact that Chinese stocks were climbing ever higher while the Chinese economy was cooling should have been an unmistakable warning of a bubble, but it caused surprisingly little concern.Some people claim that this Chinese stock market crisis is the same as 2008’s financial crisis. However, there is a big difference: American’s financial crisis could be described as a byproduct of the neoliberalism trend happened after the 1970s. Over consumption and overdraw from future income is the main cause of 2008’s global crisis, which also greatly affected China’s economy; but today’s Chinese stock crisis has different origin. The soaring up index is a government oriented market boost, not a symbol of recovering economy. It’s a

One major factor that contributed to their recession is the fact that Chinese currency, the yuan, was devalued on August 11th of this year; a decrease of 4.4% which in turn led to their stock market plunging into a crash (Wolff). Consequently making the majority of imports into China more expensive and leaving their citizens with less purchasing power for goods and services. By the population left without being able to make as many purchases, the industrial activity and manufacturing of goods slowed down thus meaning that if not as many goods are being produced then not as much gasoline or oil is being used for assembly lines, transportation, etc (The Causes…). To put simply, if there are less funds circulating, the public will spend less, fewer goods and services will be created, and less oil and gasoline will be consumed. With China being the second largest economy in the world, the downfall of their own market tends to rattle other countries in close business relations, one of which is the United States (Ranasinghe).

Compared to the deterioration of America and Europe economic situation due to the financial crisis in 2008, China’s

There has always been a persistent hustle between reality and its abstractions. Seldom do we find that a model aimed at capturing a portion of reality has provided both accurate and consistent results. Such a friction between reality and a proposed model of it can also be found in the case of China’s credit policy. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) fixed the exchange rate of the yuan to the US dollar in the middle of the 1990s. In spite of the currency turmoil and depreciation during the Asian crisis, the Yuan Renminbi (RMB) was held at 8.28 to a dollar although there was a 50% depreciation. After 2005 the RMB exchange rate was only allowed to appreciate on tiptoes at 5% a year to the dollar before the Great Financial Crisis