| THERE were under the Law (excellent King) both daily sacrifices and freewill offerings;
the one proceeding upon ordinary observance, the other upon a devout cheerfulness. In like manner
there belongeth to kings from their servants both tribute of duty and presents of affection. In the
former of these I hope I shall not live to be wanting, according to my most humble duty, and the
good pleasure of your Majesty’s employments: for the later, I thought it more respective to make
choice of some oblation which might rather refer to the propriety and excellency of your individual
person, than to the business of your crown and state. |
1 |
| Wherefore representing your Majesty many times unto my mind, and beholding you not with the
inquisitive eye of presumption to discover that which the Scripture telleth me is inscrutable, but
with the observant eye of duty and admiration; leaving aside the other parts of your virtue and
fortune, I have been touched, yea and possessed with an extreme wonder at those your virtues and
faculties which the philosophers call intellectual; the largeness of your capacity, the faithfulness
of your memory, the swiftness of your apprehension, the penetration of your judgment, and the
facility and order of your elocution: and I have often thought that of all the persons living that I
have known, your Majesty were the best instance to make a man of Plato’s opinion, that all knowledge
is but remembrance, and that the mind of man by nature knoweth all things, and hath but her own
native and original notions 1 (which by the strangeness
and darkness of this tabernacle of the body are sequestered) again revived and restored: such a
light of nature I have observed in your Majesty, and such a readiness to take flame and blaze from
the least occasion presented, or the least spark of another’s knowledge delivered. And as the
Scripture saith of the wisest king, That his heart was as the sands of the sea; which though
it be one of the largest bodies yet it consisteth of the smallest and finest portions; so hath God
given your Majesty a composition of understanding admirable, being able to compass and comprehend
the greatest matters, and nevertheless to touch and apprehend the least; whereas it should seem an
impossibility in nature for the same instrument to make itself fit for great and small works. And
for your gift of speech, I call to mind what Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus Cæsar; Augusto
profluens, et quæ principem deceret, eloquentia fuit; [that his style of speech was flowing
and prince-like: 2] for if we note it well, speech that
is uttered with labour and difficulty, or speech that savoureth of the affectation of art and
precepts, or speech that is framed after the imitation of some pattern of eloquence, though never so
excellent,—all this has somewhat servile, and holding of the subject. But your Majesty’s manner of
speech is indeed prince-like, flowing as from a fountain, and yet streaming and branching itself
into nature’s order, full of facility and felicity, imitating none, and inimitable by any. And as in
your civil estate there appeareth to be an emulation and contention of your Majesty’s virtue with
your fortune; a virtuous disposition with a fortunate regiment; a virtuous expectation (when time
was) of your greater fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in the due time; a virtuous
observation of the laws of marriage, with most blessed and happy fruit of marriage; a virtuous and
most Christian desire of peace, with a fortunate inclination in your neighbour princes thereunto: so
likewise in these intellectual matters, there seemeth to be no less contention between the
excellency of your Majesty’s gifts of nature and the universality and perfection of your learning.
For I am well assured that this which I shall say is no amplification at all, but a positive and
measured truth; which is, that there hath not been since Christ’s time any king or temporal monarch
which hath been so learned in all literature and erudition, divine and human. For let a man
seriously and diligently revolve and peruse the succession of the emperors of Rome, of which Cæsar
the dictator, who lived some years before Christ, and Marcus Antoninus were the best learned; and so
descend to the emperors of Græcia, or of the West, and then to the lines of France, Spain, England,
Scotland, and the rest; and he shall find this judgment is truly made. 3 For it seemeth much in a king, if by the compendious extractions of other
men’s wits and labours he can take hold of any superficial ornaments and shews of learning, or if he
countenance and prefer learning and learned men: but to drink indeed of the true fountains of
learning, nay to have such a fountain of learning in himself, in a king, and in a king born, is
almost a miracle. And the more, because there is met in your Majesty a rare conjunction as well of
divine and sacred literature as of profane and human; so as your Majesty standeth invested of that
triplicity which in great veneration was ascribed to the ancient Hermes; the power and fortune of a
King, the knowledge and illumination of a Priest, and the learning and universality of a
Philosopher. This propriety inherent and individual attribute in your Majesty deserveth to be
expressed not only in the fame and admiration of the present time, nor in the history or tradition
of the ages succeeding; but also in some solid work, fixed memorial, and immortal monument, bearing
a character or signature both of the power of a king and the difference and perfection of such a
king. |
2 |
| Therefore I did conclude with myself, that I could not make unto your Majesty a better oblation
than of some treatise tending to that end; whereof the sum will consist of these two parts: the
former concerning the excellency of learning and knowledge, and the excellency of the merit and true
glory in the augmentation and propagation thereof; the later, 4 what the particular acts and works are which have been embraced and
undertaken for the advancement of learning, and again what defects and undervalues I find in such
particular acts; to the end that though I cannot positively or affirmatively advise your Majesty, or
propound unto you framed particulars, yet I may excite your princely cogitations to visit the
excellent treasure of your own mind, and thence to extract particulars for this purpose agreeable to
your magnanimity and wisdom. |
3 |
| IN the entrance to the former of these,—to clear the way, and as it were to make
silence to have the true testimonies concerning the dignity of learning to be better heard without
the interruption of tacit objections,—I think good to deliver it from the discredits and disgraces
which it hath received; all from ignorance; but ignorance severally disguised; appearing sometimes
in the zeal and jealousy of divines, sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politiques, and
sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves. |
4 |
| I hear the former sort say, that knowledge is of those things which are to be accepted of with
great limitation and caution; that the aspiring to over-much knowledge was the original temptation
and sin, whereupon ensued the fall of man; that knowledge hath in it somewhat of the serpent, and
therefore where it entereth into a man it makes him swell,—Scientia inflat, [knowledge
puffeth up;] that Salomon gives a censure, That there is no end of making books, and that much
reading is weariness of the flesh; and again in another place, That in spacious knowledge
there is much contristation, and that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety; that
St. Paul gives a caveat, That we be not spoiled through vain philosophy; that experience
demonstrates how learned men have been arch-heretics, how learned times have been inclined to
atheism, and how the contemplation of second causes doth derogate from our dependence upon God, who
is the first cause. |
5 |
| To discover then the ignorance and error of this opinion and the misunderstanding in the grounds
thereof, it may well appear these men do not observe or consider that it was not the pure knowledge
of nature and universality, a knowledge by the light whereof man did give names unto other creatures
in Paradise, as they were brought before him, according unto their proprieties, which gave the
occasion to the fall; but it was the proud knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man to give
law unto himself and to depend no more upon God’s commandments, which was the form of the
temptation. Neither is it any quantity of knowledge how great soever that can make the mind of man
to swell; for nothing can fill, much less extend, the soul of man, but God and the contemplation of
God; and therefore Salomon speaking of the two principal senses of inquisition, the eye and the ear,
affirmeth that the eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing; and if there be no
fulness, then is the continent greater than the content: so of knowledge itself and the mind of man,
whereto the senses are but reporters, he defineth likewise in these words, placed after that
calendar or ephemerides which he maketh of the diversities of times and seasons for all actions and
purposes; and concludeth thus: God hath made all things beautiful, or decent, in the true return
of their seasons: Also he hath placed the world in man’s heart, yet cannot man find out the work
which God worketh from the beginning to the end: declaring not obscurely that God hath
framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass capable of the image of the universal world, and joyful
to receive the impression thereof, as the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only delighted in
beholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but raised also to find out and discern
the ordinances and decrees which throughout all those changes are infallibly observed. And although
he doth insinuate that the supreme or summary law of nature, which he calleth the work which God
worketh from the beginning to the end, is not possible to be found out by man; yet that doth
not derogate from the capacity of the mind, but may be referred to the impediments, as of shortness
of life, ill conjunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over from hand to hand, and many
other inconveniences, whereunto the condition of man is subject. For that nothing parcel of the
world is denied to man’s inquiry and invention he doth in another place rule over, when he saith,
The spirit of man is as the lamp of God, wherewith he searcheth the inwardness of all
secrets. If then such be the capacity and receit of the mind of man, it is manifest that
there is no danger at all in the proportion or quantity of knowledge, how large soever, lest it
should make it swell or out-compass itself; no, but it is merely the quality of knowledge, which be
it in quantity more or less, if it be taken without the true corrective thereof, hath in it some
nature of venom or malignity, and some effects of that venom, which is ventosity or swelling. This
corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledge so sovereign, is Charity, which the apostle
immediately addeth to the former clause; for so he saith, knowledge bloweth up, but charity
buildeth up; not unlike unto that which he deilvereth in another place: If I spake
(saith he) with the tongues of men and angels, and had not charity, it were but as a tinkling
cymbal; not but that it is an excellent thing to speak with the tongues of men and angels,
but because if it be severed from charity, and not referred to the good of men and mankind, it hath
rather a sounding and unworthy glory than a meriting and substantial virtue. And as for that censure
of Salomon concerning the excess of writing and reading books and the anxiety of spirit which
redoundeth from knowledge, and that admonition of St. Paul, That we be not seduced by vain
philosophy; let those places be rightly understood, and they do indeed excellently set forth
the true bounds and limitations whereby human knowledge is confined and circumscribed; and yet
without any such contracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the universal nature of
things. For these limitations are three. The first, that we do not so place our felicity in
knowledge, as we forget our mortality. The second, that we make application of our
knowledge to give ourselves repose and contentment, and not distaste or repining. The third,
that we do not presume by the contemplation of nature to attain to the mysteries of God. For
as touching the first of these, Salomon doth excellently expound himself in another place of the
same book, where he saith; I saw well that knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance as light doth
from darkness, and that the wise man’s eyes keep watch in his head, whereas this fool roundeth
about in darkness: but withal I learned that the same mortality involveth them both. And for
the second, certain it is, there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which resulteth from knowledge
otherwise than merely by accident; for all knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of knowledge) is
an impression of pleasure in itself: but when men fall to framing conclusions out of their
knowledge, applying it to their particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vast
desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind which is spoken of: for then knowledge
is no more Lumen siccum [a dry light], whereof Heraclitus the profound said, Lumen siccum
optima anima, 5 [the dry light is the best soul;]
but it becometh Lumen madidum, or maceratum, [a light charged with moisture,] being
steeped and infused in the humours of the affections. And as for the third point, it deserveth to be
a little stood upon and not to be lightly passed over: for if any man shall think by view and
inquiry into these sensible and material things to attain that light whereby he may reveal unto
himself the nature or will of God, then indeed is he spoiled by vain philosophy: for the
contemplation of God’s creatures and works produceth (having regard to the works and creatures
themselves) knowledge; but having regard to God, no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken
knowledge. And therefore it was most aptly said by one of Plato’s school, That the sense of man
carrieth a resemblance with the sun, which (as we see) openeth and revealeth all the terrestrial
globe; but then again it obscureth and concealeth the stars and celestial globe: so doth the
sense discover natural things, but it darkeneth and shutteth up divine. And hence it is true
that it hath proceeded that divers great learned men have been heretical, whilst they have sought to
fly up to the secrets of the Deity by the waxen wings of the senses. And as for the conceit that too
much knowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance of second causes should make
a more devout dependence upon God which is the first cause; first, it is good to ask the question
which Job asked of his friends: Will you lie for God, as one man will do for another, to gratify
him? For certain it is that God worketh nothing in nature but by second causes; and if they
would have it otherwise believed, it is mere imposture, as it were in favour towards God; and
nothing else but to offer to the author of truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie. But farther, it is
an assured truth and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of
philosophy may incline the mind of man to atheism, but a farther proceeding therein doth bring the
mind back again to religion; for in the entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are
next unto the senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there, it may
induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the
dependence of causes and the works of Providence; then, according to the allegory of the poets, he
will easily believe that the highest link of nature’s chain must needs he tied to the foot of
Jupiter’s chair. To conclude therefore, let no man, upon a weak conceit of sobriety or an
ill-applied moderation, think or maintain that a man can search too far or be too well studied in
the book of God’s word or in the book of God’s works; divinity or philosophy; but rather let men
endeavour an endless progress or proficience in both; only let men beware that they apply both to
charity, and not to swelling; to use, and not to ostentation; and again, that they do not unwisely
mingle or confound these learnings together. |
6 |
And as for the disgraces which learning receiveth from politiques, they be of this nature; that
learning doth soften men’s minds, and makes them more unapt for the honour and exercise of arms;
that it doth mar and pervert men’s dispositions for matter of government and policy, in making them
too curious and irresolute by variety of reading, or too peremptory or positive by strictness of
rules and axioms, or too immoderate and overweening by reason of the greatness of examples, or too
incompatible and differing from the times by reason of the dissimilitude of examples; or at least
that it doth divert men’s travails from action and business, and bringeth them to a love of leisure
and privateness; and that it doth bring into states a relaxation of discipline, whilst every man is
more ready to argue than to obey and execute. Out of this conceit Cato surnamed the Censor, one of
the wisest men indeed that ever lived, when Carneades the philosopher came in embassage to Rome, and
that the young men of Rome began to flock about him, being allured with the sweetness and majesty of
his eloquence and learning, gave counsel in open senate that they should give him his dispatch with
all speed, lest he should infect and inchant the minds and affections of the youth, and at unawares
bring in an alteration of the manners and customs of the state. Out of the same conceit or humour
did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage of his country and the disadvantage of his own
profession, make a kind of separation between policy and government and between arts and sciences,
in the verses so much renowned, attributing and challenging the one to the Romans, and leaving and
yielding the other to the Grecians; Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento, Hæ tibi erunt
artes, &c.
|
[Be thine, O Rome, |
|
With arts of government to rule the nations.] |
|
Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est, |
|
Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit. |
|
Telis, Phœbe, tuis lacrymas ulciscere nostras. |
|
[O Phœbus with thy shafts avenge these tears.] |
|
Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes |
|
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros; |
|
Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, |
|
Quique metus omnes et inexorabile fatum |
|
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari. |
|
|
|
[Happy the man who doth the causes know |
|
Of all that is: serene he stands, above |
|
All fears; above the inexorable Fate, |
|
And that insatiate gulph that roars below.] |
|
victorque volentes |
|
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo: |
|
|
|
[Moving in conquest onward, at his will |
|
To willing peoples he gives laws, and shapes |
|
Through worthiest deeds on earth his course to Heaven.] |
|
Suave mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis, &c. |
| Note 1. So edd. 1629 and 1633. Ed. 1605 has
motions. [back] |
| Note 2. Observe that the translations within
brackets are not in the original, but inserted by myself. My reasons for
adopting this plan, and the principle upon which I have proceeded in
translating, are explained in the preface. [back] |
| Note 3. In the translation the reference to the
particular dynasties is omitted; he only says,—Percurrat qui voluerit
imperatorum et rerum seriem, et juxta mecum sentiet. [back] |
| Note 4. I have observed elsewhere, that it was
only the latter part which entered into the original scheme of the
Instauration Magna. And though in adapting the Advancement of
Learning to it, he retained the former part, yet he marks it in the
translation as comparatively unimportant; adding with regard to the first,
quæ levior est, neque tamen ullo modo prætermittenda, and with regard to
the second, quod caput rei est. [back] |
| Note 5. [Greek]: a corruption, according to the
conjecture of Professor W.H. Thompson, of [Greek] having been first inserted by
one commentator, to explain the unusual word [Greek], and so passed into the
text; [Greek] having been turned into [Greek] by another, to make sense. See
Remains of Professor Archer Butler, vol. i. p. 314. [back] |
| Note 6. So in all the editions. [back] |
| Note 7. i. e. they have for their object
either the applause of others or some inward gratification of their own. (hoc
videntur agere, aut ut alii plaudant, aut ut ipsi intra se gestiant.)
[back] |
| Note 8. Pytheas, according to Plutarch. [back] |
| Note 9. Patribus mendicantibus (pace eorum
dixerim).—De Aug. [back] |
| Note 10. So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have
the. The meaning is, “upon this text they observe,” &c. (Ex hoc
textu colligunt.) [back] |
| Note 11. So ed. 1633. The original has
hath. [back] |
| Note 12. This parenthesis is omitted in the
translation, no doubt as offensive to the Roman Catholics. Several other
passages of the same kind occur in the Advancement, and they are all
treated in the same way. The motive for which is sufficiently explained by Bacon
himself in the letter which he sent to the King along with the De
Augmentis. “I have been also (he says) mine own Index
Expurgatorius, that it may be read in all places. For since my end of
putting it into Latin was to have it read everywhere, it had been an absurd
contradiction to free it in the language and to pen it up in the matter.” Mr.
Ellis made a list of these passages, which will be noticed in their places. The
word enemy in the next clause is omitted, probably from the same motive.
[back] |
| Note 13. And that learning (the translation
adds), unless the mind into which it enters be much depraved, corrects the
natural disposition and changes it for the better. [back] |
| Note 14. i. e. not [I mean, from such
manners as are] inherent, &c. (nullum occurrit dedecus literis, ex
literatorum moribus, quatenus sunt literati, adhærens.) [back] |
| Note 15. i. e. customary. Morem illum
receptum libros patronis nuncupandi.—De Aug. Ed. 1629 has
moderne. [back] |
| Note 16. The passage which follows is much
curtailed in the translation; no doubt for the reason mentioned in note 12. All
allusion to the “higher Providence,” the “degenerate traditions” of the church,
the study of the ancient authors, and the “primitive but seeming new opinions”
is left out; and we are only told that this distemper of luxuriance of speech
(though in former times it had been occasionally in request) began to prevail
very much about the time of Luther; chiefly on account of the demand for fervour
and efficacy of preaching, &c. The remarks on the style of the schoolmen,
and the hatred which at that time began to be conceived against them are
retained. [back] |
| Note 17. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has
that then. [back] |
| Note 18. In the translation he mentions another
vanity of style, though not of so bad a kind, as commonly succeeding the last in
point of time,—a style in which all the study is to have the words pointed, the
sentences concise, and the whole composition rather twisted into shape than
allowed to flow (oratio denique potius versa quam fusa): a trick which
has the effect of making everything seem more ingenious than it really is. Such
a style (he says) is found largely in Seneca, less in Tacitus and the second
Pliny, and has found favour of late with the ears of our own time; but though it
is agreeable to ordinary understandings and so procures some respect for
literature, yet to more exact judgments it is deservedly distasteful, and may be
set down among the distempers of learning, being, as well as the other, a kind
of hunting after words and verbal prettiness. [back] |
| Note 19. That is, fierce from being kept in the
dark; the allusion being, as we see more clearly from a corresponding passage in
an early Latin fragment [ferocitatem autem et confidentiam quæ illos qui
pauca norunt sequi solet, (ut animalia in tenebris educata,)
&c.—Cog. de Sci. Hum. 1st fragm. § 10.], to the effect of darkness on
the temper of animals.—R. L. E. The rest of this sentence, from “but as
they are” is omitted in the translation. See note 12. [back] |
| Note 20. I think this is the sense in which Bacon
must have understood these words; but it is not the sense in which Tacitus
employs them (An. v. 10.). He meant that they at once invented the tale and
believed it: they “credited their own lie.”—J. S. [back] |
| Note 21. So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have
or as. [back] |
| Note 22. The rest of the paragraph is omitted in
the translation. See note 12. [back] |
| Note 23. Sake in the original, and also in
edd. 1629 and 1633. [back] |
| Note 24. So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have
consuls. The translation has dictatoria quadam potestate munivit ut
edicant, non senatoria ut consulant. Bacon probably wrote
counselti. [back] |
| Note 25. So the original. Ed. 1633 has
illustrated. [back] |
| Note 26. So the original. Ed. 1633 has
devoute. [back] |
| Note 27. hath in all the old editions. [back] |
| Note 28. quæ Dionysii Areopagitæ nomine
evulgatur, are the words of the translation: the insinuation implied in
the word supposed, being withdrawn, or at least not so strongly
expressed. See note 12. [back] |
| Note 29. verdor in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633;
which perhaps ought to be retained, as another form of the word rather than
another way of spelling it. [back] |
| Note 30. This clause is omitted in the
translation; and the words cætera viri egregii are introduced after the
name of Gregory. See note 12. [back] |
| Note 31. All this, from the beginning of the
paragraph, is omitted in the translation. See note 12. [back] |
| Note 32. honour in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633.
[back] |
| Note 33. commonly in edd. 1629 and 1633.
In the original, com- ends a line and the rest of the word has
accidentally dropped out. [back] |
| Note 34. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has
sciences. [back] |
| Note 35. In the De Augmentis he merely
says “de quibus,” i. e. the golden times, “sigillatim sed brevissime
verba faciam.” And the next five paragraphs are condensed into one. [back] |
| Note 36. Agric. 3.: Quanquam.…Nerva Cæsar res
alin dissociabiles miscuerit, principutum ac libertatem. This quotation
is omitted in the translation, where nothing is said of the character of Nerva’s
government except that he was clementissimus imperator, quique, si nihil
aliud, orbi Trajanum dedit; from which it would almost seem that Bacon
thought it hardly deserved the praise which Tacitus bestows upon it. In evidence
of his learning he adds that he was the friend, and as it were the
disciple, of Apollonius the Pythagorean. [back] |
| Note 37. To this story Dante alludes in the tenth
canto of Purgatory; taking it apparently from the life of Gregory by Paul
the Deacon. It seems first to have been mentioned by John Damascene in his
discourse “De iis qui in fide dormierunt;” form whom St. Thomas Aquinas quotes
it in his Supplementary Questions, 7l. 5. The hymn sung in the fourteenth
century in the Cathedral of Mantua on St. Paul’s day, is another curious
instance of the appreciation of Heathen worth in the middle ages. It is there
said of St. Paul,
Ad Maronis mausoleum
Ductus fudit super eum
Piæ rorem lacrymæ;
Quem te, inquit, reddidisæm
Si te vivum invenisæm
Poetarum maxime!
See Schœll’s Histoire de la Littérature Romaine.—R. L. E. This whole
passage is omitted in the translation. [back] |
| Note 38. Plutarch, Apoph. [back] |
| Note 39. There seems here a confusion of two
stories. It was Alexander Severus who according to Lampridius had a picture of
our Saviour “matched with Apollonius” and with some others. Hadrian however did
honour Apollonius and is said to have thought of dedicating a temple to Christ,
which, if I remember rightly, Alexander actually did.—R. L. E. [back] |
| Note 40. So in all three editions. Qy. Trajan?
[back] |
| Note 41. pollicing, edd. 1605 and 1629.
pollishing, ed. 1633. [back] |
| Note 42. Antonius, edd. 1605, 1629, 1633.
[back] |
| Note 43. In the translation he says that Lucius
though not so good as his brother was better than most of the other emperors.
(Fratri quidem bonitate cedens, reliquos imperatores plurimos superans.)
[back] |
| Note 44. lynes, ed. 1605 and 1629.
lines ed. 1633. [back] |
| Note 45. So edd. 1629 and 1633. Ed. 1605 has
grace. [back] |
| Note 46. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have or; with
a semicolon after learning, where the original has a comma; the omission
of which makes the meaning and construction clear. [back] |
| Note 47. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has
the. [back] |
| Note 48. This paragraph is entirely omitted in
the De Augmentis; no doubt as one which would not be allowed at Rome and
might lead to the proscription of the book. See note 12. [back] |
| Note 49. All this from the beginning of the
paragraph is omitted in the translation. [back] |
| Note 50. cum tam indigentia tam redundantia
naturæ, per illa duo designata, mortis sin, tanquam arrhabones; the two
opposite imperfections of nature, deficiency and superfluity, exhaustion and
incontinence, being as it were earnests of mortality. [back] |
| Note 51. This passage is translated without
addition or alteration. But Bacon seems to have changed his opinion afterwards
upon the point in question. For in the sixth book of the De Augmentis, c.
1., he intimates a suspicion that Cæsar’s book was not a grammatical philosophy,
but only a set of precepts for the formation of a pure, perfect, and unaffected
style. See Vol. I. p. 654. [back] |
| Note 52. tumultuaria cognitio. [back] |
| Note 53. So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has
face. [back] |
| Note 54. verdour in the original and also
in edd. 1629 and 1633. See note 12. [back] |
| Note 55. So all three editions. The translation
has nos autem.…conculcantes hæc rudimenta atque offucias sensuum, novimus
&c. [back] |
|
